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Abstract. The pre-tabular statistical disclosure control (SDC) method of data 
swapping is the preferred method for protecting Census tabular data in some 
National Statistical Institutes, including the United States and Great Britain. A 
pre-tabular SDC method has the advantage that it only needs to be carried out 
once on the microdata and all tables released (under the conditions of the output 
strategies, eg. fixed categories of variables, minimum cell size and population 
thresholds) are considered protected. In this paper, we propose a method for 
targeted data swapping. The method involves a probability proportional to size 
selection strategy of high risk households for data swapping.  The selected 
households are then paired with other households having the same control 
variables. In addition, the distance between paired households is determined by 
the level of risk with respect to the geographical hierarchies. The strategy is 
compared to a random data swapping strategy in terms of the disclosure risk 
and data utility.  
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1   Introduction 
Protecting tables containing Census counts is more difficult than protecting tabular 
data from a survey sample since sampling a priori introduces ambiguity into the 
frequency counts. More invasive statistical disclosure control (SDC) methods are 
needed to protect against disclosure risks in a Census context where tables include 
whole population counts and this impacts negatively on the utility of the data.  It is 
well known that Census data have errors due to data processing, coverage 
adjustments, imputations for non-response and edit and imputation procedures, 
although much effort is devoted to minimizing these errors. When assessing 
disclosure risk, it is essential to take into account these errors and the protection that 
is already inherent in the data. A quantitative measure of disclosure risk should 
consider for example the amount of imputation and adjust parameters of the SDC methods to be inversely proportional to the imputation rate. This ensures that the data 
is not overly protected causing unnecessary loss of information. It should be noted 
that once Census results are disseminated, they are typically perceived and used by 
the user community as accurate counts.  
The main disclosure risk in a Census context comes from small counts in the 
tables, i.e. ones and twos, since these can lead to re-identification. Indeed, the amount 
and placement of the zeros in the table determines whether new information can be 
learnt about an individual or a group of individuals. Therefore, SDC methods for 
Census tabular data should not only protect small cells in the tables but also introduce 
ambiguity and uncertainty into the zero values.  
SDC methods for protecting Census tables that are typically implemented at 
National Statistical Institutes (NSI) include pre-tabular methods, post-tabular methods 
and combinations of both. In this paper we focus on a pre-tabular method which is 
implemented on the microdata prior to the tabulation of the data. The most commonly 
used method is data swapping between a pair of households matching on some control 
variables (Willenborg and de Waal, 2001). This method has been used for protecting 
Census tables at the United States Bureau of the Census and the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) in the United Kingdom. Data swapping can be seen as a special case 
of a more general pre-tabular method based on a Post-Randomization Method 
(PRAM) (Gouweleeuw, Kooiman, Willenborg and De Wolf, 1998). This method adds 
“noise” to categorical variables by changing values of categories for a small number 
of records according to a prescribed probability matrix and a stochastic process based 
on the outcome of a random multinomial draw. PRAM can also be carried out in such 
a way as to ensure marginal distributions and because it is a stochastic perturbation, 
users can make use of the probability transition matrix to adjust their statistical 
analysis. This method however has yet to be implemented for a large scale Census. In 
practice, NSIs prefer data swapping since the method is easy to implement and 
marginal distributions are preserved exactly on higher aggregations of the data. It 
should be noted that NSIs do not typically release parameters of the SDC methods, 
i.e. swapping rates or probability transition matrices, in order to minimize the risk of 
deciphering the perturbation process.  
      In this paper, we propose a   data swapping strategy that is targeted to high risk 
households. In addition, the distance between paired households for carrying out the 
swap is determined by the geographical level that is most at risk as defined by unique 
cells on margins of key variables (Young, Martin and Skinner, 2009). The targeted 
data swapping strategy is compared to a random data swapping strategy through 
quantitative disclosure risk and data utility measures according to the disclosure risk–
data utility framework as described in Willenborg and De Waal (2001), Duncan, 
Keller-McNulty, and Stokes (2001) and Shlomo (2007). The data utility is assessed 
by analyzing the impact of the data swapping strategies on chi-square tests for 
independence as well as measuring distortions to cell counts for specified Census 
tables. Disclosure risk is assessed by the proportion of unique cells that are not 
perturbed in the tables. The analysis will be demonstrated on a real data set extracted 
from the UK 2001 Census.  
Section 2 outlines the data swapping methods that are assessed and Section 3 
details the data and Census tables that are used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the results of the comparison between the swapping methods followed by a discussion 
and conclusions in Section 5.  
2   Data Swapping Methods 
The most common pre-tabular method of SDC for Census tables is data swapping on 
the microdata prior to tabulation where values of variables are exchanged between 
pairs of households.  In order to minimize bias, pairs of households are determined 
within strata defined by control variables, such as a large geographical area, 
household size and the age sex distribution of the individuals in the households.  Data 
swapping can be targeted to high risk households found in small cells of tables as 
described in Section 2.1 thereby ensuring that   households that are most at risk for 
disclosure are more likely to be swapped.   
In a Census context, geography variables are often swapped between households 
for the following reasons:  
  Given household characteristics, other Census variables are likely to be 
independent of geography and therefore it is assumed that less bias will be 
induced. In addition, because of the conditional independence assumption, 
swapping geography will not necessarily result in inconsistent and illogical 
records. In contrast, swapping a variable such as age would result in many 
inconsistencies with other Census variables, such as marital status and education 
level.  
  At a higher geographical level and within control strata, the marginal 
distributions are preserved.  
  The level of protection increases by swapping variables which are highly 
“matchable” such as geography. 
  There is some protection for disclosure risk arising from differencing two tables 
with nested geographies since data swapping introduces ambiguity into the true 
cell counts and in particular the zero counts.   
2.1   Targeted Data Swap Strategy 
Targeted data swapping is based on an allocation of a p% sample of households    
where  p is the swapping rate to be determined by the NSI.  Typically the data 
swapping is carried out within blocks of large geographical areas, eg., Estimation 
Area or Census Delivery Group Area. Within these large areas are   hierarchies of 
geographies. For the UK 2001 Census data, there are three layers of nested 
geographies: Local Authority (LA), Wards and Output Areas (OA).  
Census tables contain counts of individuals so to identify high risk households we 
need to first identify high risk individuals.   High risk individuals are defined on the 
basis of frequency counts of univariate distributions on a set of key variables that are 
typically used to span Census tables at different levels of geography. A cell of size 
one on the univariate distribution means that there will be a unique individual on one 
of the margins of the table. Uniques on the margin of a table increase the risk of attribute disclosure since individuals can be identified on the basis of some of the 
variables spanning the table, and once identified, a new attribute can be learnt. High 
risk is defined through a score that is calculated for each individual as follows:  
-  Calculate frequency counts for M selected key variables each having 
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-  A threshold is set for each level of geography and those scores above the 
thresholds determine high risk individuals. 
-   High risk households are defined as any household having at least one high risk 
individual.  
     The overall sample size in a Delivery Group area is calculated by multiplying the 
swap rate by the number of non-imputed households. This sample is then allocated 
across the lower level geographies (eg., OAs). We propose using two proportional 
allocations according to:   
(1)  the inverse   number of (non-imputed) households in the  OA, i.e. the larger the    
 OA the less  swapping required, 
(2)  the percentage of high risk households in the OA.  
     The final sample size for each OA is taken as the average sample size across the 
two proportional allocations provided that the final sample size is not over 20% of the 
number of (non-imputed) households in the OA. The random sample of households is 
drawn within each OA using a probability proportional to size (pps) design according 
to the above allocation. The size variable for the pps sampling is calculated so that a 
high value is given to high risk households and a low value is given to low risk 
households. This ensures that a disproportionate number of households at high risk 
will be selected in the sample and at the same time,  guarantees that households of 
low risk will have a  small but positive chance of   being selected  in the sample in 
order to introduce some randomness into the data swapping.   
 After the sample is selected, each of the households must be paired with another 
household in order to swap the geographical variables. The paired household must 
match on a set of control variables, eg. household size,  age group  and sex 
distribution, ethnicity indicator, ‘hard to count’ index.  For the targeted swapping 
strategy we introduce the notion of distance swapping as defined in Young, Martin 
and Skinner, 2009.  The idea is to pair households for swapping at a distance that is 
consistent with the geographical level of disclosure risk. Similar to the method 
carried out for defining high risk individuals, we first calculate the univariate 
distribution frequencies of individuals for the key variables at each geographical 
level. If there is a unique individual on any of the categories of the key variables at a 
geographical level g, the individual is flagged for that geographical level. The 
household geographical disclosure risk level is then defined as the highest 
geographical risk level from among all individuals in the household. For example, if 
there is an individual in a household that is flagged as being unique on one of the 
categories of the key variables at the ward level and another individual in the same household that is flagged at the LA level, the entire household is flagged at the LA 
level of disclosure risk. The geographical level of disclosure risk is used in the 
algorithm for swapping as described below: 
For the selected household to be swapped, we first check the level of geographical 
disclosure risk and choose a paired household at the appropriate geography having 
the same control variables. For example, if the level of geographical disclosure risk is 
flagged at LA, then the household must be swapped with a similar household having 
the same control variables in a different LA but within the large Delivery Group 
Area. If the level of geographical disclosure risk is flagged at ward, then the 
household must be swapped with another household having the same control 
variables in a different ward but within the same LA. If the level of geographical 
disclosure risk is flagged at OA, then the household must be swapped with another 
household having the same control variables in a different OA but within the same 
ward.  Therefore, selected sampled households are swapped with other households 
having the same control variables but only at a distance that is appropriate to the 
geographical level of risk with respect to the uniqueness on marginal distributions of 
the key variables. The advantage of ‘localized’ data swapping is that we minimize the 
distance between pairs of households depending on the geographical level of risk and 
therefore at higher aggregations of geography we expect less distortion.   
    The search for a paired household in the swapping algorithm is carried out 
through several iterations. In the first attempt, the sampled household must match the 
paired household on a full set of control variables, eg. ‘hard to count’ index, 
household size, ethnicity indicator, sex and broad age distribution in the household. In 
subsequent attempts to search for a paired household, control variables undergo 
gradual collapsing to allow a better chance of finding a pair for the sampled 
household.  Note that no household can be paired twice. Once a household is selected, 
all geographical variables are swapped between the two households. 
2.2   Random Data Swap Strategy 
We compare the targeted data swapping strategy in Section 2.1 with a random data 
swapping strategy. The same swapping rates are used for both strategies. The 
difference between the strategies is that households are selected for swapping using a 
simple random sample without replacement design in each OA, i.e. all households 
have equal chance of being selected for swapping. The sampled household is then 
paired with another household having the same control variables using the iterative 
procedure described above but no attempt is made to target high risk households or 
control the distance between swapped households.   
3   Data   
For this analysis, targeted and random data swapping strategies described in Section 2 
were carried out on households from an extract of the 2001 UK Census containing 
two LAs at the following swapping rates: 2% and 5%.   The extract included 327,718 individuals in 124,979 households. In the two LAs there were 35 wards and 1,111 
OAs.   
            We define the following Census tables of individuals at the lower level of 
geography   OA, where the number of categories are given in parenthesis:   
(1)     Religion(9)  Age-Sex(6)  OA 
(2)     Travel to Work(12)  Age-Sex(12)  OA 
(3)     Ethnicity (17)     Sex(2)     OA 
(4)     Country of Birth (17)  Sex (2)   OA 
(5)     Economic Activity (9)  Sex (2)  Long-Term Illness (2)  OA 
(6)     Health status (5)  Age-Sex (14)  OA 
The  characteristics of the five tables are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, the 
tables have different average cell sizes and distributions of small cells. We also 
produce the same Census tables (1) to (6) at the ward level geography. 
 
Table 1.  Characteristics of Census tables at the OA geography 
  Table 1  Table 2  Table 3  Table 4  Table 5  Table 6 
Number of 
Individuals  
327718 240,797  327,718 327,718 238,727  325,594 
Number of 
internal cells 
59,994  159,984  37,774 37,774 39,996  77,770 
Average cell size 
 
5.46 1.51  8.68 8.68 5.97  4.19 
Number of zeros  34,546  
(57.6%) 
103,361
 (64.6%) 
23,939 
(63.4%) 
19,723 
(52.2%) 
12,697 
(31.7%) 
40,363 
(51.9%) 
Number of 1s  5,298 
(8.8%) 
20,793
(13.0%) 
5,468 
(14.5%) 
7,329 
(19.4%) 
6,634 
(16.6%) 
11,260 
(14.5%) 
Number of 2s   2,771 
(4.6%) 
10,304 
(6.4%) 
2,607 
(6.9%) 
3,767 
(10.0%) 
4,511 
(11.3%) 
6,183 
(8.0%) 
4   Analysis 
To compare the two data swapping strategies described in Section 2, we assess 
disclosure risk in terms of the proportion of unswapped unique cells in the Census 
tables described in Section 3, and data utility in terms of distortions to distributions 
and statistical inference.  
4.1   Disclosure Risk 
Disclosure risk arises from small cells in tables (or small cells appearing in potential 
slithers of differenced tables). In addition, the number and placement of zero cells can 
lead to identification and attribute disclosure when many tables are disseminated 
from one database.    
     Pre-tabular methods of disclosure control, and in particular data swapping, will not 
inhibit small cells from appearing in tables and therefore a quantitative disclosure risk measure is needed which  reflects whether the small cells in  tables are true values. 
The quantitative disclosure risk measure for assessing the impact of data swapping is 
the proportion of   cells of size one that have not been perturbed. This is calculated by 
counting the number of cells that have both an original and perturbed count of one 
divided by the number of cells with an original count of one. Let  
O T   represent the 
original table and let    be the cell frequency c in table  ) (c T
O O T . Similarly, 
P T   
represents the swapped table. The risk measure is defined as:  



 

c
O
c
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c T c T I
DR
) 1 ) ( (
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where I is the indicator function receiving a value of 1 if it is true and 0 otherwise. 
Note that we ignore those individuals that have been imputed to adjust for the Census 
under-coverage since these are not considered at risk.  In Table 2 we present the DR 
proportions for the Census tables described in Section 3. We also present the DR in 
Table 3 for smaller Census tables defined by the main marginal variable crossed with 
the OA geography.  
 
Table 2.  Proportion of unperturbed unique cells (DR) in the Census tables 
 
Target 5%  Target 2%  Random 5%  Random 2%  Table 
0.650  0.749  0.853  0.939  (1) 
0.822  0.912  0.837  0.932  (2) 
0.457  0.549  0.848  0.944  (3) 
0.629  0.723  0.831  0.924  (4) 
0.779  0.894  0.805  0.910  (5) 
0.819  0.925  0.828  0.929  (6) 
 
Table 3. Proportion of unperturbed unique cells (DR) on the margins of the Census tables 
Target 5%  Target 2%  Random 5%  Random 2%  Table 
0.495   0.595  0.851  0.954  ReligionOA 
0.800  0.912  0.826  0.899  Travel to work OA 
0.347  0.421  0.832  0.934  Ethnicity OA 
0.518  0.590  0.803  0.916  Country of  birth OA 
0.584  0.816  0.668  0.823  Economic activityOA 
0.737  0.821  0.684  0.811  Health status OA 
 
     In Tables 2 and 3, we see that the higher swapping rate protects more unique cells 
than the lower swapping rate. The random swapping has higher proportions of unique 
cells that are unperturbed than the targeted swapping. These results are as expected. 
The overall disclosure risk in some Census tables is high, even for the 5% data 
swapping, with over 80% of unique cells unperturbed. In addition, there are two clear 
patterns in Tables 2 and 3. All Census tables have the highest disclosure risk at the 
2% random swap   and the lowest disclosure risk at the 5% targeted swap. For some 
tables, the 2% targeted swap provides lower disclosure risk than the 5% random swap, for example in Tables (1), (3) and (4).  The reason for this pattern is that the marginal 
distributions of religion, ethnicity and country of birth (as well as age-sex 
distribution) were used to define high risk households which according to the pps 
sampling had more chance of being selected into the sample for swapping. It is clear 
that the disclosure risk based on variables that are used to define high risk households 
would be reduced considerably under the targeted data swapping approach.  
4.2  Data Utility 
Data utility measures  used in this analysis are based on a distance metric to measure 
the distortion  to distributions and the impact on a measure  of association based on a 
statistical test  for independence between categorical variables.  
 Some useful distance metrics were presented in Gomatam and Karr (2003).  The 
distance metric that is used in this analysis is the average absolute distance per cell of 
a Census table calculated as: 
T
c
O P P O n c T c T T T AD / | ) ( ) ( | ) , (       where   is 
the number of cells in the Census table.  
T n
 Table 4   presents results of the distance metric AD for the Census tables defined 
in Section 3 at the OA geography and Table 5 the same distance metric AD for the 
Census tables defined at the ward geography. The aim is to show that at higher 
aggregations of geography, the targeted data swapping strategy obtains less distortion, 
i.e. smaller distance metrics, compared to the random data swapping at a given 
swapping rate because of the ‘localized’ search for the household pair.  
 
Table 4.  Average absolute distance per cell (AD) for Census tables with OA geography 
  
Target 5%  Target 2%  Random 5%  Random 2%  Tables (OA) 
0.841  0.499  0.732  0.391  (1) 
0.455  0.238  0.427  0.208  (2) 
0.916  0.665  0.523  0.266  (3) 
0.713  0.486  0.496  0.261  (4) 
0.621  0.338  0.577  0.294  (5) 
0.555  0.290  0.526  0.272  (6) 
      
Table 5.  Average absolute distance per cell (AD) for Census tables with ward geography 
 
Target 5%  Target 2%  Random 5%  Random 2%  Tables (wards) 
1.547  1.227  2.754  1.627  (1) 
0.678  0.559  2.034  1.141  (2) 
2.219  1.708  2.260  1.273  (3) 
1.528  1.133  2.677  1.567  (4) 
1.366  1.081  3.468  2.055  (5)  
1.035  0.822  2.781  1.664  (6) 
 
In Table 4 the highest AD metric representing the most distortion in cell counts 
according to the OA geographical level is obtained under the targeted 5% swap and 
the lowest AD metric is obtained under the random 2% swap.  The random swapping 
strategy has lower   AD metrics than the targeted swapping strategy which means that more bias is introduced into the Census tables at the OA geography due to the 
targeted selection of households to swap. For most of the Census tables, the  targeted 
2% swap has less distortion to the cell counts compared to the  random 5% swap, with 
the exception of Census table (3) involving the variable ethnicity.  Ethnicity in 
particular was used for the targeted data swapping strategy for defining high risk and 
also as an indicator in the control variables for selecting paired households. This 
likely induced more bias into the table. 
Table 5, however, presents a different picture for the Census tables at the 
aggregated ward geography level. Obviously, the disclosure risk is considerably less 
when aggregating to the ward level with less possibility of unique cells. The random 
data swapping shows more distortions per cell than the targeted data swapping for 
each of the swapping rates. This clearly demonstrates that taking into account the 
geographical level of risk when pairing households for swapping as implemented in 
the targeted data swapping strategy ensures much less bias at higher aggregations of 
geographies.  
    A very important statistical tool that is frequently carried out on contingency 
tables is the Chi-Square test for independence based on the Pearson Chi-Squared 
Statistic    which tests the null hypothesis that the criteria of classification, when 
applied to a population, are independent. The Pearson Statistic for a two-dimensional 
table is defined as:  
2 
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 where under the null hypothesis of 
independence:   ,   is the marginal row total and   is the 
marginal column total.  
eij j n.
     In order to assess the impact of the SDC methods on tests for independence, the 
Pearson statistic obtained from a perturbed contingency table is compared to the 
Pearson statistic obtained from the original contingency table. In particular, we focus 
on the measure of association, Cramer’s V defined as: 
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difference: 
) (
) ( ) (
100 ) , (
O
O P
P O
T CV
T CV T CV
T T RCV

   
 Table 6   presents results of the percent relative difference in the Cramer’s V 
Statistic (RCV) based on the different data swapping strategies and swapping rates for 
each of the Census tables in Section 3 according to the OA geography.   
  
Table 6.  Percent difference in Cramer’s V (RCV) for Census tables with OA geography  
 
Target 5%  Target 2%  Random 5%  Random 2%  Tables 
-2.345  -1.090  -1.228  -0.660  (1) 
-1.213  -0.689  -1.525  -0.641  (2) 
-2.567  -1.710  -1.614  -0.927  (3) 
-0.884  0.347  -1.380  -0.601  (4) 
-2.065  -1.046   -1.635  -0.920  (5) 
-0.941  -0.479  -0.986  -0.573  (6)  
The values in Table 6 are all generally negative which means that the swapped 
tables provide a measure of association that is always smaller than the measure of 
association based on the original table.  This implies that data swapping of 
geographical variables attenuates the distributions in the tables and they lean more 
towards independence.  Table 6 shows mixed results between the random and targeted 
swapping strategies at the same level of swapping rate. Tables (1), (3), (5)  have 
higher RCV under the targeted data swapping while the other tables have lower RCV. 
Again, the reason for this pattern is due to the use  of key variables to define high risk 
households which had  a disproportionate chance of being selected for swapping.  For 
those variables, the targeted swapping strategy induces more bias. In general, the 2% 
targeted swapping have lower values of RCV compared to the  5% random swapping, 
although this is not the case for Census table (3) where the 2% targeted swap has a 
higher RCV than the 5% random swap. Similar results are obtained at the ward level 
geography.  
4.3  R-U Confidentiality Map 
In this section, an R-U Confidentiality Map (Duncan, et al., 2001) is presented for the 
different data swapping strategies on each of the Census tables at the OA geography 
defined in Section 3. Figure 1 presents the empirical R-U confidentiality map based 
on the disclosure risk measure DR on the y-axis and the distance metric   AD on the x-
axis (note that the x-axis is reversed since a high AD represents low utility).   
  
 
Figure 1. R-U confidentiality map with DR (proportion of unperturbed unique cells) on the y-
axis and the    AD (distance metric) on the x-axis for all Census tables   
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 The lower left hand quadrant in Figure 1 represents low utility-low disclosure risk 
and the upper right hand quadrant high utility-high disclosure risk. In many cases, the 
2%  targeted data swapping has a lower disclosure risk than the 5% random data 
swapping and in general higher  utility, i.e. smaller distance metrics AD. A line on the 
frontier of the data points is drawn in Figure 1 representing the points with the highest  
utility at each given disclosure risk. Three of the points are based on the 2% targeted 
swap and this would be the preferred option for this analysis based on the swapping 
rates and swapping strategies studied.    
5  Discussion 
In general, data swapping as a sole SDC method for protecting Census tables results 
in high probabilities that small cells in tables are true values. The method should be 
used in combination with other SDC methods, for example implementing a 
comprehensive and strict output design strategy with fixed categories of variables, 
population thresholds, etc. or some small cell masking.  
      We propose a targeted data swapping strategy which lowers the disclosure risk for 
a given swapping rate compared to random data swapping, especially for Census 
tables involving key variables that are used to define high risk households that are 
targeted for swapping. Higher swapping rates raise the level of protection but also 
cause more loss of utility.  The results from the analysis show  that the proposed 
targeted data swapping lowers disclosure risk approximately equal to that of a random 
data swapping at double the swapping rate whilst having generally higher utility.  The 
analysis also showed that there are considerable gains using the targeted data 
swapping strategy compared to a random data swapping strategy, especially when 
aggregating lower levels of geography.  
      In any perturbative SDC method that is used to protect statistical data there are 
hidden non-transparent effects to the data which impacts on the ability to carry out 
statistical analysis.  While the Census tables have the advantage that they are 
consistent and additive, this is undermined by the inability to obtain confidence 
intervals that take into account the perturbation. NSIs need to provide information and  
guidance to users in order to inform them of the impact of   SDC methods and how to 
analyze disclosure controlled statistical data. Quality measures should be 
disseminated with the release of the Census tables to allow users to try and correct 
inferences using measurement error models.  
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